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Abstract | The incipient therapeutic movements of the late-Victorian and Progressive eras 
in the US are salient to understanding the ways in which the desire to heal and be healed 
has at once a subtle and far-reaching influence on how crisis is understood and social 
transformation is carried out.  Historians of late have amply documented how lay, faith, 
and medical healers of these eras negotiated new forms of selfhood amidst a rapidly 
changing political and socioeconomic order.  Yet the historical portrait remains incomplete 
insofar as critical examination has not been paid to the “crisis resolution” specific to this re-
formation: the optimistic healing narrative that the sociomedical discourse on nervous 
diseases engendered.  Such an investigation into this veritable birth of the therapeutic helps 
disclose how a dominant set of psychosomatic interpretations and healing modalities could 
cohere alongside both the evolving structure of monopoly capitalism and the designated 
roles people assumed within it.   
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Presenting a paper on the technique of psychotherapy before the American Neurological 
Association in 1907, St. Louis neurologist Sidney Schwab made the case for assimilating 
this experimental practice into his profession’s therapeutic repertoire.  The case: a 35-
year-old divorced woman victimized by an unhappy marriage, locked into a dreary 
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“household regime”, and suffering from symptoms of fatigue and irritability (“the not 
uncommon neurasthenia hysteria symptom-complex”) as well as acute skin irritations 
over her ovarian region.  Schwab detailed how he attempted to heal her by creating “de 
novo a social life” for her.  Being a woman of some literary talent, he devised an 
admittedly “very artificial” social existence in order to give her a sense of importance, of 
fulfilling some purpose in life through employment, while ultimately providing her with 
an “ideal of living apart from the mental and physical sufferings which (she) had been so 
long accustomed”.  In this process, Schwab remarked how the small group of people of 
“robust personality and sane views” impressed upon her a new appreciation for “the 
tangible business of life”, while her verse, published in the Atlantic, Scribner’s, and the 
Century, lessened her “tendency towards self-minimization”, and diverted her from 
dwelling on her neurasthenic symptoms.  Completing the process, he attempted to 
“dissect former erroneous ideas and hopes (in order) to substitute a saner conception 
and a more definite appreciation of the whole scheme of existence”.  A year and a half 
later Schwab observed that, despite lingering symptoms of neurasthenia and hysteria, 
she acquired “a totally different feeling about herself” and is an “active, busy, and fairly 
happy and reasonably contented … member of society”.  Such a success as this, he 
concluded, meant that the “technique or system of psychotherapeutics must in the long 
run be made up of the accumulated wisdom of many such experiments” (1907). 
 Analyzing historical snapshots similar to this one, social and cultural historians 
have recently documented how lay healers, physicians, and other specialists of the late-
Victorian and Progressive eras treated nervous diseases sensibly and, at times, more 
effectively than previously recognized.  At the same time, they have convincingly argued 
how practitioners developed psychiatric techniques and psychotherapeutic healing 
principles prior to the introduction of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic therapy.1  The 
                                                
1 Notable examples of this historiography include: Theriot, 2001; Satter, 1999; Caplan, 1998; 
Gifford, 1996; Lutz, 1991; and Gosling, 1988.  Also, similar arguments are advanced in Fuller, 
1982 and G.T. Parker’s Mind Cure in New England: From the Civil War to World War I (1973).  
Much of this historiography, moreover, revises earlier contributions, such as D. Meyer’s The 
Positive Thinkers: Religion as Pop Psychology from Mary Baker Eddy to Oral Roberts ( 1980); 
R. Weiss’s The American Myth of Success: From Horatio Alger to Norman Vincent Peale (1969); 
J. Lears’s No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 
1880-1920 (1981), and “From Salvation to Self-Realization: The Therapeutic Origins of the 
Consumer Culture, 1880-1930” (1983), which link the self-help literature of the late-Victorian and 
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sociomedical discourse of these periods, moreover, attests to the evolving meeting 
ground between practitioner and patient, one that encapsulated, as historian Beryl Satter 
recently argued, the enterprise of “fashioning new forms of gendered selfhood to fit a 
changing political and economic order” (1999: 254; cf. Lutz, 1991).  Yet while this 
historical judgment gives due consideration to the transformative power that middle- 
and upper-class Americans of these eras exerted in shaping and adapting to large-scale 
social changes, it remains incomplete insofar as critical attention has not been paid to 
their preponderant desire to heal and be healed: the optimistic healing narrative that the 
discourse on nervous diseases engendered; or in other terms, the “crisis resolution” 
specific to this re-formation.2  That lay, medical, and religious healers managed to 
transcend their cultural milieus, in this regard, tends to slight not only how they may 
have simultaneously precluded alternative ideas or experiential realities which otherwise 
transcended their own (Bessette, 2012); it also does not fully confront the function of this 
discourse and narrative within an industrialized, market-dominated society that 
accumulated wealth and misery in equal measure (Beatty, 2007).  For to examine the 
self-help techniques crafted by naturalistic, faith-based healers up to the psychological 
                                                                                                                                            
Progressive eras to the emergence of a therapeutic worldview that provided the middle class with  
new modes of accommodation to the emerging corporate capitalist system.    
2 A partial exception to the historiography, in this regard, is Philip Cushman’s social 
constructionist/ hermeneuticist approach in Constructing the Self, Constructing America: A 
Cultural History of Psychotherapy (1995) in which he argues that mesmerism emerged as the 
first healing technology in the US to popularize and deploy a treatment regime that aimed to 
expand and liberate the self while diverting attention away from the unchecked growth of the 
industrialized capitalist system.  Such a regime, then, unwittingly coincided with the state’s 
expansionist goals and voluntaristic strategy of controlling the middle class, especially women, by 
appearing to set them free (117-39).  As persuasive as much of Cushman’s analysis is, though, 
much of its polemical force owes to the sociological model of development underpinning it, a 
model which discounts the emphasis Freudian clinical theory and Victorian-era psychologies 
placed upon the apparatus of internal, intrapsychic processes, as a “local truth of a specific set of 
people at a specific moment in history” (204), at best, and an implement of control and 
depoliticization (157-8), at worst.  He in turn tends to eliminate the psyche as such (by stressing 
adaptive behavior—unconscious mental functioning—while minimizing the formation of internal 
processes—the role of unconscious mental structures and primitive impulses) subsuming it and 
the self under a particular historical construct, a “cultural frame of reference” (133).  The 
weakness of this model, then, (and the weakness of intersubjective—relational—psychoanalytical 
theory, in general) is its tendency to stress the self’s immanent plasticity and reflexivity by 
delimiting the scope of its interactions and experiential realities to the play of conscious, objective 
forces.  This creates an asymmetry in Cushman’s analysis in that it does not adequately elucidate 
the genetic moment through which a powerful frame of reference resonates and takes hold in the 
first place.  For a comparative review of psychoanalytic theories since Freud, see Kernberg, 2004: 
1-59.   
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dissection and behavioral modification that medical men like Schwab deployed is to 
interrogate how, as Foucault identified, individualization techniques and totalization 
procedures took root in daily life and imposed a “law of truth” on the individual by 
marking “him by his own individuality, (by) attach(ing) him to his own identity” (1982: 
781).  Such an investigation into this veritable birth of the therapeutic helps disclose how 
a dominant set of psychosomatic interpretations and treatments could cohere alongside 
the evolving structure of monopoly capitalism and the designated roles people assumed 
within it.   
 
 
The Harmony of Retreat: The Mind-Cure Movement 
The milieu of postbellum industrialization in which nervous diseases (or “neurasthenia,” 
as New York neurologist George M. Beard labeled it) entered the lexicon was one in 
which groups of alternative lay and faith healers sought to break free from the grips of a 
materialistically-dominated society and an interventionist medical orthodoxy.  
Predominated by “(e)xternalism, artificiality, egoism and materialism”, as the socialist 
and ardent advocate of Christian Science B.O. Flower observed, American society had 
rapidly fallen under a spell-like enchantment that ineluctably courted “spiritual death” 
(1910: 46-47, 56).  Writing in 1869, Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of Christian Science, 
voiced this same sentiment: “To legally abolish slavery in the United States was good, but 
its abolition in the human mind is a more difficult task…. We still have men and women 
of all races in bondage, ignorant of how to obtain their freedom” (1889: 68).  This 
critique by one of the most prominent mental healers to emerge in the late nineteenth 
century captures the crusade-like opposition to illness and iatrogenic injury that a 
number of middle- and upper-middle-class Americans evinced.  Whether it was the 
mesmerist psychologies initiated by P.P. Quimby, Eddy’s Christian Science, Warren Felt 
Evans’s practical mysticism, or the emotional abundance therapies of the New Thought 
movement which ascended in the 1890s, mental healers rejected in varying degrees the 
dominance of material over spiritual thought, and what they saw as the objectification of 
the individual by orthodox medicine (Caplan, 1998; Teahan, 1979).  To mind curists (as 
pragmatic philosopher William James dubbed them) and other alternative healing 
persuasions such as osteopathy, homeopathy, naturopathy, and eclecticism, allopathic 
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medicine’s reflexive reliance on drugs and its frequent recourse to surgery, especially 
since the introduction of anaesthesia in the 1840s, fostered a dependency in the mind of 
the sick upon artificial support and materialistic ways of thinking (Pernick, 1985; 
Whorton, 2002).   
 In part, mind cure’s emphasis on the spiritual resources of the individual 
protested against the rationalistic turn allopathic medicine took in the 1860s, and the 
latter’s technological approach to disease and suffering, which reduced individual 
illnesses to simple malfunctions rectifiable through medical intervention (Warner, 1986; 
Figlio, 1977).  As this often meant tying an illness like neurasthenia back to some specific 
physiological disorder, especially in the case of women who could not claim “overwork” 
as a reason for their sickness, it all too often sanctioned gynecological or urinary surgery 
in response.  In this way, scientific medicine had come to resemble the same 
depersonalized, intrusive, physical force that epitomized the social Darwinian “struggle 
for existence” (Gosling and Ray, 1986).  Considered alongside the fact that the most 
prominent feature of the mind-cure movement was the “ubiquity of women”, as historian 
Donald Meyer pointed out, the emphasis on metaphysical or spiritual self-healing 
reflected the desire of middle- and upper-middle-class women to retain their selfhood 
from this aggressive, male-dominated practice of medicine (1980: 46).   
 But while mind curists shared essentially the same impulse of other feminist 
reformers like Jane Addams and Charlotte Perkins Gilman in wanting to break free from 
ossifying conventions, they charted a much different ideological course than the latter in 
the face of nervous illnesses.  If feminists championed women’s entry into the world of 
commerce as the solution to their neurasthenia, mind cure presented nervously-ill 
women with a way of turning their weakness and passivity into a strength, with a project, 
as Meyer argued, “that did not require them to wrestle with the world” (1980: 59).  
Hence instead of devoting oneself to charity or social work, or attempting to enter the 
masculine sphere of work, “(t)he project of getting well could be pursued entirely within 
oneself” (Meyer, 1980: 59).  Additionally, against the distressing feeling of being subject 
to impersonal economic forces, mind cure insisted that the mind had its own order (God 
is mind) and thus held out to women a realm in which they might feel that life was under 
their control.  As one of its most popular proponents Ralph Waldo Trine maintained, 
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“instead of being an embodiment of weakness and a creature of circumstances, you will 
find yourself a tower of strength and a master of circumstances” (1897: 147).   
 Alongside this optimistic faith in the empowering potential of metaphysical 
healing, mind curists saw modern civilization as responsible for the incidence of nervous 
illness. While the popular neurologist, electrotherapist, and Spencerian evolutionist 
George M. Beard saw a lack of adaptation at root, mind curists conversely saw a 
recession from nature as responsible.  The growth of “Artificialism”, according to Henry 
Wood (1893: 27), caused people to “become hyper-sensitive to discord and morbidity.  
Insanity, insomnia, and nervous degeneration are increasingly prevalent”, he argued, 
“and even the physical senses more than ever before require artificial aids and props”.  In 
his conclusion, the problem boiled down to dependence “upon the Without rather than 
the Within”.  From this understanding, the consensus among mind curists was that only 
spiritual or “psychical remedies”, as Evans (1884) asserted, could remove what was 
essentially a spiritual disturbance.  But instead of placing their trust in scientific 
medicine or evolutionary adaptation, mind cure held that the individual must redress the 
imbalance within, and once again return mind, the spirit, to its sovereignty over matter 
(Eddy, 1889).  The harmonizing of the individual with society would follow then as the 
nervously-ill soul retired inward and retreated to “a higher plane of activity” (Evans, 
1884), or rejected the sense-bound mortal mind for the omnipotent “Divine Mind” 
(Eddy, 1889).  Echoing the evolutionary optimism of Beard, Wood declared that while 
the “weak negative condition of the individual and the race cannot be overcome at once”, 
the “high time” had arrived “for a general movement to conquer.  Soul must rise superior 
to environment, dominate body, and free itself from degrading and long-continued 
servitude” (Wood, 1893: 85-86; cf. Wood, 1908: 96-101, 286-87).   
 But the paradox of mind-cure’s vision of an empowered life free of nervous 
suffering through spiritual progress was that it called upon middle- and upper-middle- 
class Americans, especially women, to exercise more self-control on top of the demands 
civilized culture already imposed upon them.  At one end, mind curists rejected the 
ecclesiasticism of their orthodox forbearers and the way, according to Horatio Dresser, 
the historian of New Thought, “it dwelt on sin, emphasized the darkness and misery of 
the world, the distress and the suffering” (1919: 161-66).  Ruminating on the harm done 
by generations of Calvinist hell-fire and damnation preaching, Wood averred how only 
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“boundless divine love, exuberance, and vitality, constantly poured in, even though 
unconsciously to us, could in some degree neutralize such an ocean of morbidity” (1893: 
54-55; cf. Cady, 1919: 25-26).  Thus as opposed to the “undeniably pessimistic” 
orientation of the “old thought”, the “new dwelt on life and light”, and thereby pointed 
“the way to the mastery of all sorrow and suffering” (Dresser, 1919).  Yet to achieve this 
“evolutionary idealism”, this vision of an affliction-free life, mind cure did not call for a 
relaxation of conscious restraints, but rather for a new exigency to purge the mind of all 
disease-producing thoughts so that disease could not “enter and gain a foothold” 
(Dresser, 1908; Eddy, 1889: 30).  The ego must avoid roaming, according to Wood, in 
the dank and murky atmosphere of “sensuous consciousness” or else “a host of negative 
phantoms, shadows, and specters take on veritable reality and overwhelming power” 
(1893, 1908).  Additionally, only by achieving a “passive and receptive” state of mind, 
barring “the door of thought against the external world”, and concentrating on an ideal 
suggestion, wholly giving “YOURSELF UP TO IT, until it fills and overflows the entire 
consciousness”, he stressed, could the individual actualize her ideals of well-being.  With 
Charles Fillmore’s contribution, the regimentation of both body and mind became more 
explicit as he held that his healing suggestions ought to be “applied as one applies 
mathematical rules … for mental discipline” (1917: 3).  In this regard, the contagion of 
introspection and morbid thoughts that the influential nerve specialist S. Weir Mitchell 
sought to cordon neurasthenic-prone women off from with his “rest cure”, mind curists 
transmuted into the loftiness of a spiritual precept (1885).  And as such, their 
preponderant and fecund desire to heal repaired the permeable, “leaky” self (Bordogna, 
2008: 13-201) only to end up reconciling it more firmly with society’s immanent, strife-
torn plane of activity (Trachtenberg, 1982: 70-100).  
 Thus while either barring the door to “morbidity” and the subconscious, or 
denying the latter’s existence altogether in the case of Christian Science, mind cure 
eschewed a deeper interrogation of functional illness.  By localizing the source of illness 
entirely within the interior life, the individual psyche, and relegating matter to secondary 
status, mind curists effectively dissolved the burdensome cultural framework of late-
Victorian society.  In this way, the nervously ill had to look no further than themselves to 
find the source of “inharmony”.  Mind being “the governing element, the controlling 
principle” of man’s inner life, according to Evans in his amalgamation of German 
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idealism, American Transcendentalism, and mesmerism, such a disease was simply “an 
abnormal mental condition … a wrong belief”; “change that belief, and we cure the 
disease” (1873: 210, orig. italics, here and below; Teahan, 1979).  In explaining how such 
an abnormality developed, mind curists argued that the ill stood in violation of divine 
law.  “As long as there is the violation of law”, Trine reasoned, “so long disease and 
suffering will result” (1897: 59-60).  Elaborating upon this argument, he found that all 
frictions, uncertainties, sufferings, fears, “come to us because we are out of harmony 
with the divine order of things…. Rowing against the tide is hard and uncertain” (1897: 
217-18).   On the other hand, the person who goes with the tide takes “advantage of a 
great natural force (that) is safe and easy”.  In the end, he says, “body, soul, and mind 
become perfectly harmonized, and when this is so, life becomes full and complete”. 
 Yet as mind curists made clear, this divine, harmonious state of being was 
predicated upon unswerving obedience to the secular order of things.  As Charles 
Fillmore declared, “(i)t is not for us to quarrel with the conditions of the world, nor take 
upon ourselves the burden of righting them”; instead, there “is a state of consciousness, 
which can be and is being attained by men, where all things are provided to fulfill the 
desires of the regenerated souls” (1917: 238-39).  In this light, fundamental to mind 
cure’s strategy for overcoming nervous illness was the self’s subjective acceptance of the 
prevailing moral order, its laissez-faire attitude toward the status quo (Wood, 1903, 
1908; Meyer, 1980).  Spurning all thought and activity that might upset the affliction-
free balance within the self, mind curists preached a conformist re-formation in the 
name of health.  “Think no evil”, Wood counseled, “and have eyes only for the good.  
Optimism is of God, and it stimulates and attracts its possessor along the upward road 
towards the ideal and the perfect” (1908: 272).  In contrast, pessimism, or “being against 
something”, “creates and multiplies unwholesome conditions, and galvanizes them into 
apparent life” (Wood, 1893: 58).  Trine, in turn, made Wood’s implicit conflation of 
divine order and secular order explicit.  According to him, since “God or Infinite Being” 
worked through the “great systems of law”, it followed that to “know these laws, and to 
live, to work in harmony with them brings peace and harmony”.  Obversely, to willfully 
“violate them brings inharmony and struggle and suffering” (1910: 270-71).  That 
Dresser, on this note, saw ill-health as indicative of “undue emotion or ecstasy”, and 
pessimism as a pathology of “physical excess or disorder” meant that all matters of 
Diffractions.	  Graduate	  Journal	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture	  




personal and social contentedness logically devolved upon mental science’s impending 
progress: “For when a cure for depression is found, a way of escape from pain and 
sorrow, misery and calamity, in so far as these imprison, why should one any longer view 
life pessimistically?” (1902: 51-55).  Thus as they dissolved, in their undivided focus on 
the nervously-ill’s mind state, the repressive interdictions of late-Victorian culture, mind 
curists abjured that which threatened to enmesh regenerated souls in either conflicting 
loyalties or “entangling alliances”, and divert them from union with “the ideal and the 
perfect”, politics (Wood, 1908: 108; Meyer, 1980).   
 Out of this happy conformism, then, mind curists helped engender a new 
therapeutic valuation of selfhood in which endless personal conquests over disease led to 
an “endless development of health and happiness” (Wilmans, 1900: 242).  Here as 
individuals cultivated the power of positive thought, they secured, according to Helen 
Wilmans in The Conquest of Death, “the growth of fresh powers … (that) add to our 
ability to conquer every obstacle in the way of the actualization of the ideal”—the “power 
to live … in constantly replenished youth, vigor and beauty” (1900: 246, 287; cf. Tuttle, 
1907; Marden, 1909).  Thus from their initial coupling of self-control with spiritual 
vitality, to their buoyant equations of both desire with prosperity, and renewed health 
with divine revelation, the movement did not so much undergo a shift (by the early 
twentieth century) towards a narrower concern with positive thinking and self-
realization, as much as its subservience of sacral authority to temporal being began to 
come into sharper relief (Royce, 1909).3  As such, the source transcendent to social order, 
that which renders judgment and reordering of it possible, became more and more 
indiscernible (Rieff, 1990).4  In this manner, though, mind curists sought to realize the 
                                                
3 On this point, I disagree with the respective contentions of historians Robert Fuller and Beryl 
Satter concerning the movement’s discursive shift by the early twentieth century, viz. that New 
Thoughtists departed from the attainment of health via the denial of desire to the attainment of 
prosperity via the expression of it (Fuller, 1982: 137-162; Satter, 1999: 14).  While the literature 
certainly supports Fuller’s claim that it provided “a convenient ideological shelter to many who 
were all too willing to be anesthetized to the burdensome demands life kept making on them” 
(178), it does not, however, mark a departure from the overall tenor and trajectory of the 
movement.  For the template of achieving renewed health by screening out the larger social world 
remained at the forefront.   
4 As Jacques Ellul (1975, 212-13) perspicuously argued: “When God enters the picture he destroys 
man’s sacred…. It is forgotten that in (the) word of God there is attestation of man’s sin, of the 
rupture between man and God, of man’s situation within evil.  To void that, to reduce it is, on the 
one hand, to render the remainder of the revelation completely meaningless, and on the other 
hand, it is to prevent oneself any longer from seeing modern man’s sacralizing, for this man 
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same socioevolutionary goal that more orthodox practitioners like Beard and Weir 
Mitchell did by envisioning “permanent paths of progress” within the individual while 
evading the challenges and anxieties of individuality (Wilmans, 1900: 206, 266-68). 
 In historical perspective, then, what mind-cure’s existential, “crisis resolution” 
strategy reveals is how it did not so much seek to overcome, or come to terms with, 
nervous illness through a deeper, spiritual reckoning, as much as it sought to evade it 
altogether.  Like the prominent physicians opposite to them, mind curists shored up the 
demands of a dominant culture whose transcendent framework of meaning was 
weakening while, like their feminist contemporaries, evincing a similar incapacity to 
blaze a path beyond the boundaries of the prevailing order.  In their simple 
hermeneutics, the rusty, burdensome shackles of Calvinist “morbidity” were in large part 
responsible for the incidence of nervous illnesses among their class.  As such, mind 
curists embraced a revolution that was entirely internal; “wrong belief”, they assured 
their fellow bourgeoisie, was the only thing preventing them from enjoying the material 
bounties of civilization’s progress and attaining mystical wholeness with the world.  
Likewise, by equating strength with dependency, and health with passivity, they not only 
reinforced the ideology of domesticity; they did so “at the price”, as Meyer argued, “of 
withdrawal from consciousness, self and impulse” (1980: 122).  
 But perhaps the most significant repercussion of mind-cure’s worldview was its 
devaluation of the subjective experience of nervous illness as no more than an abnormal, 
existential deviation from the objective, unbroken progress of civilization.  By combining 
dogmatic optimism (the “immediate projection” of a wish for greater harmony) with a 
means of “denying non-wishful reality” (Meyer, 1980: 81, 123-24), mind cure not only 
offered its middle- and upper-middle-class patrons an escape from the anxieties of 
individuality; it allowed them to artificially preserve the identity between divine order 
and social order, on the one hand, and individual and society, on the other (Dresser, 
1903).  Christened as “the psychology of success”, according to Dresser, its melding with 
the performance ethos of the emerging managerial capitalist elite reveals how all 
disjunctures between these two poles faded into immateriality before the “constructive 
                                                                                                                                            
creates a sacred for himself and finds himself a religion only in order to counter the prior 
situation.  To deny that situation is to accept, without seeing it, the religion created by man in an 
uncritical manner.  Any critique could be applied only to outmoded and dead religions of the past, 
which man has abandoned because they no longer do him any good”. 
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attitude”, the “attitude habitually making for health, freedom, prosperity” (1919: 162, 
325-26; Weiss, 1969).  And as medical and faith-based healers armed with greater 
psychological insight into the relationship between mind and body confronted cities 
wracked by pathologies of social disorganization (Starr, 1982), and the sight of various 
walks of life “scorched”, as novelist Robert Herrick wrote, by “the heat of living”, this 
attitude had all the markings of a cure (1908: 11).   
 
Inoculating the Soul: The Psychotherapeutic Movement 
“If the nineteenth century was materialistic and critical”, the Rev. Dr. Elwood Worcester 
proclaimed in 1908, “the first half of the twentieth century promises to be mystical and 
spiritual.  Already we are conscious of a general revolt in the name of the soul” (1908: 8).  
As the founder of the pastoral-based, psychotherapeutic Emmanuel Movement of Boston 
in 1905, Worcester’s transcendentalist sentiment reflected the resonance that the 
burgeoning mind-cure movement had among liberal Protestants in the East (Haller, 
1981).  Trained in psychology in Germany under Gustav Theodor Fechner and Wilhelm 
Wundt, and retaining close ties to both the influential nerve specialist Weir Mitchell in 
Philadelphia and the internist Richard Cabot of Massachusetts General Hospital, 
Worcester’s Movement blended liberal Christianity, psychological theory on the powers 
of the subliminal self, and the latest in medical psychotherapy.  Together with his 
pastoral associate, Samuel McComb, and his medical colleagues, Isador Coriat, M.D. and 
Joseph H. Pratt, M.D., the Emmanuel Movement sought to respond to the growing 
skepticism among all classes toward the practices of orthodox medicine, while also 
fulfilling a physical healing function long neglected by the church (Hale, 1971; Baker, 
1909; Powell, 1909). 
 As the movement captured the attention of other physicians, it spread to other 
cities across the country.  On the one hand, such a rapprochement between religious and 
medical professionals reflected the growing disillusionment over the “somatic style” 
(which most orthodox practitioners, nerve specialists, and neurologists adhered to) for 
its failure to provide conclusive knowledge of the brain and nervous system, and with it, 
the scientific control of disease (Putnam, 1909; Caplan, 1998; Hale, 1971).  Other 
contributing developments came from the renewed appreciation for the body’s own 
healing potential through osteopathic medicine (Whorton, 2002); the holistic 
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“physiological principle” as emphasized by neurologist James Putnam (1904); the 
psychobiological studies of Adolf Meyer (1911); and the emphasis on the roles that 
emotions and ideas had on the body by the American physiologist Walter B. Cannon 
(Hale, 1971).  All contributed to a more unified conception of body and mind.  With its 
emphasis on the spiritual component of well-being, the Emmanuel Movement came to 
embody this new unitary principle, where not only the whole brain, or the whole nervous 
system, but the “whole man”, it declared, should be the concern of the physician (Powell, 
1909; Hale, 1971). 
 But while Worcester and his colleagues helped advance this new psychosomatic 
approach to nervous illness, they also reaffirmed the underlying assumptions of the 
neurasthenic discourse that the Spencerian George M. Beard delineated almost thirty 
years earlier (1908: 133-49).  In a lengthy reprisal of Beard’s arguments in American 
Nervousness (1881), Worcester noted how nervousness had increased and spread 
throughout society due to environmental causes: the exacting demands of a profit-driven 
society and modern life’s dizzying array of interests.  The incidence of early deaths and 
suicides of “our ablest men”; an increase in both nervousness and insanity; diminishing 
offspring of the “cultured classes”; and the general recourse to alcohol and narcotics, 
revealed to him “a limit set to the dissipation of man’s energies”.  Also, echoing the 
criticism of capitalist industries that prominent social gospellers such as Walter 
Rauschenbusch and Washington Gladden voiced, Worcester found that these “mighty 
servants … have ended by enslaving their masters” by introducing “an element of haste 
and … feverish unrest into human life which amounts to a disease”.  Additionally, the 
more noteworthy aspects of this critique was not only how Worcester and McComb 
blamed the social structure for the rise in “temporary and irresponsible unions” among 
all classes; but how they also condemned the prevailing hypocrisy of the nation’s 
“civilized” sexual morality (which most neurologists at the time defended) for forcing 
men, and especially women, to lead nervously-damaging double lives (Hale, 1971).5   At 
                                                
5 Freud first termed the stringent sexual code that prevailed in America and Europe in the late 
nineteenth century in his 1908 essay entitled “‘Civilized’ Sexual Morality and Modern 
Nervousness”.  “The American version”, as historian Nathan Hale explained, “not only confined 
sexual intercourse within monogamous marriage, but sought to assure purity of thought as well as 
behavior, partly through reticence about all sexuality, partly through a relatively asexual 
stereotype of woman”.  The scholarship that has partly modified this stereotype: C. Degler’s 
“What Ought to Be and What Was: Women's Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century" (1974) and At 
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bottom, nervous capital to them was a scarce resource, and such a disease, they 
maintained, depleted “our forces faster than those forces are generated”.  Yet unlike 
Beard, Worcester and his colleagues did not see greater adaptation evolving out of 
greater specialization, contending that civilization’s end was on the horizon “(u)nless we 
(Americans) find some better means … to calm and simplify our lives”. 
  Although Worcester’s appeal to simplicity seemingly departed from the main 
tenet of the socioevolutionist-entrenched neurasthenic discourse, the rustic “Simple Life” 
was no more viable an option to him than it was for Beard or other influential physicians 
such as Weir Mitchell or Mary Putnam Jacobi (1908: 145; Sicherman, 1976).  Firmly 
wedded to society’s material progress, he found that a back-to-nature alternative, a 
return to “an effective milk and water existence”, inconceivable.  On the other hand, 
Worcester saw the more realistic alternative, viz. a general reduction of “the nervous 
tension in which we are living”, ruled out by the ambitious mugwump politician 
Theodore Roosevelt and his “loud roar for the Strenuous Life” (1908: 133, 145).  Since 
the onset of imperial expansionism in the late 1890s and the defeat of the anti-
imperialist movement to prevent annexation of the Philippines, Worcester stood apart 
from those intellectuals who shared Roosevelt’s vision of imperial warfare as the remedy 
for civilization’s ills.  Whereas the latter imagined, as historian Jackson Lears recently 
argued, “that ‘a great war’ might not only lance the boil of overcivilization but also banish 
the specter of neurasthenia—restoring energy to a leadership class grown nerveless and 
flaccid” (2009: 206)—Worcester and his kind did not see the efficacy in this.  In the 
latter’s eyes, this ethos of strenuous expansionism, with its emphasis on “the life of toil 
and effort, of labor and strife” (Roosevelt, 1910: 3) only contributed to “nervous tension”.  
Instead, as Worcester and company maintained, the progress in psychological knowledge 
                                                                                                                                            
Odds (1980); E. Rothman’s Hands and Hearts, (1984); P. Gay’s The Bourgeois Experience Vol. 1, 
Education of the Senses (1985); N.S. Landale and A.M. Guest’s “Ideology and Sexuality among 
Victorian Women” (1986); R.P. Maines’s The Technology of Orgasm: “Hysteria,” the Vibrator, 
and Women’s Sexual Satisfaction (1998); and G. Prochnik’s Putnam Camp: Sigmund Freud, 
James Jackson Putnam, and the Purpose of American Psychology (2006).  In light of this 
scholarship, Hale maintains that it has challenged neither “the nature of the code’s prohibitions, 
(nor) the contention that its internalization could have structured” the symptoms of American 
psychoanalysts’ first patients  (Hale, 1995: 4).  Additionally, the increase in candor over sexual 
matters, historian John Demos pointed out, was not so much a rejection of this code as it was an 
endorsement of it “in the service of ever-greater ‘purity’; except for a tiny minority of cultural 
radicals, American progressives reaffirmed the central core of traditional mores” (Demos, 1997: 
65).   
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and practice delineated the path to be taken: “an increase of moral and nervous energy to 
meet life’s demands” (1908: 145).  Thus far from questioning the assumptions Beard’s 
evolutionary optimism was grounded upon, Worcester’s Emmanuel Movement poised 
itself to become those “redeeming forces” that he envisioned, extending to all classes 
what the former held out to the “brain-working” elite, viz. greater adaptation to modern 
life (Beard, 1881: vi, 304-05; Powell, 1909; Gifford, 1996).   
 At one pole, Worcester’s program, as a counter-response to Roosevelt’s strenuous 
life, reaffirmed the prudent logic of Gilded Age physicians (1908: 153-59).  Writing with 
the overworked businessman in mind, Worcester advised him to introduce variety into 
his life by varying “work with play which really amuses him”, or by substituting 
“muscular exercise” for “mental toil”.  Rather than a change of occupation, he advised 
him to take up “a real secondary interest in life which keeps the heart young” by 
returning “to nature and the soil,” and cultivating “a renewed love of out-of-door life and 
sport”.  Similarly, just as Mitchell and most physicians at this time argued that women’s 
“biology” made them weaker than men and disposed them to nervous disorders, 
Worcester and his colleagues concurred.  Married women and married women teachers 
“are among those most benefited by rest and change”, they argued, with the additional 
stipulation that “reorganization of home life is frequently necessary”.  Likewise, where 
Mitchell recommended “abundant fresh air and exercise” for young college women, they 
commended the focus on athletics in colleges, and the overall “physical activity and 
prowess of our young women” (1887: 48).  Thus aside from counseling nervous sufferers 
to incorporate prayer into their daily lives, their escape route from “the flood of nervous 
disorders” deviated little from Mitchell’s gender-oriented, prophylactic prescriptions 
(Worcester and McComb, 1909: 73).   
 But at the other pole, and in the reform-of-the-intimate spirit of the mind curists, 
Worcester’s movement looked to effect a transformation within the individual’s psyche 
in order to overcome nervous illnesses.  In this regard, Worcester and McComb were not 
unlike other fin de siècle American social reformers and theorists who either sought to 
convert the discovery of a buried layer of the psyche into programs for social change 
(Lasch, 1965; Lears, 1981) or, in the case of psychology professor G. Stanley Hall’s 
advocacy of a healthy “savage” boyhood, avoid the enervating effects of civilization 
(Bederman, 1995).  As Hale explains, both Worcester and McComb saw the subconscious 
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as (among other things) “the locus of emotion and of will, … the source of man’s reserve 
energies” (1971: 241).  From this perspective, Worcester was also far more sanguine 
about the subconscious than either the French medical psychologist Pierre Janet (Furst, 
2008), or the Viennese psychiatrist Sigmund Freud, claiming that it was both “purer and 
more sensitive to good and evil than our conscious mind” (1908: 42; cf. 1909: 114-18).6  
And similar to William James and the psychopathologist Boris Sidis, who maintained 
that reserve energies resided within the subconscious, Worcester, McComb, and their 
acolytes held that the healing powers of it could be realized upon lifting repressions and 
breaking oneself free from stultifying routines (James, 1967; Sidis, 1910; Boyd, 1914).  
“For the first time in the history of thought”, Worcester reflected, “science is able to place 
in our hands a key which opens many a door in the house of the soul, and all who aim at 
dealing intelligently and profitably with human beings ought to be in possession of this 
key and to know what doors it will open and what doors as yet remain closed to it” (1932: 
xvi-vii). 
 Upon opening these doors, Worcester, his colleagues, and other 
psychotherapeutists discovered that the array of sociocultural pressures and harmful 
environmental factors besieging modern-day men and women had metastasized into a 
“disease of the subconscious” itself (1909: 199; cf. Dubois, 1908).  In their interpretation, 
“the effects of over-exertion” led to a dissociation of consciousness, and the person 
suffering from neurasthenic symptoms attested to how she had lost the “function of the 
real”, the sense of being a part of the world (1908: 216, 287-88).  In this line of thought, 
Worcester and company appropriated the work of Janet, whose reformulation of 
neurasthenia—“psychasthenia”—was characterized by precisely this loss of the real (la 
perte du réel), as well as nervous exhaustion and a “sense of incompleteness” (1908: 
442-43; Shamdasani, 2001).  Likewise, they agreed with both Janet and Paul Dubois, the 
influential Swiss neuropathologist, on the need for “moral treatment”: treatment that 
reeducated the self to the function of the real, while also raising the person’s mental level 
                                                
6 As Hale clarified, “(t)he unconscious of Worcester and McComb was derived not from Freud, but 
from Von Hartmann, Schopenhauer, and American traditions of mental healing and 
Transcendentalism….  Its roots were the Infinite, it was closer to the Universal Spirit”.  In other 
words, where Freud’s theory of the unconscious denoted limits to which the repressed contents 
below consciousness could be excavated and utilized, Worcester and McComb’s subconscious was 
“uncanny: it healed; it remembered everything, it solved problems; it could impart glorious, 
undreamed-of resources” (1971: 241).  On the contrast between the nineteenth century psycho-
philosophical theory of the unconscious and the Freudian, see Rieff, 1959: 34-37.   
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(1908: 56-57).  As Coriat explained, a “state of healthy-mindedness” could only be 
secured by such “a reassociation, a synthesis of this split consciousness” (1908: 217).  
The ethicality of this procedure, moreover, derived from the selfsame source, for the 
mind, as Boston neurologist Morton Prince maintained, had evolved an innate capacity 
to recognize moral principles as “desirable”; ergo, reharmonizing the psychobiological 
system with the social system entailed a straightforward “educational process” 
accomplished by simply substituting “healthy mental states … for unhealthy ones” (1885: 
161; 1975: 109-12).  Yet what is curious about this goal that psychotherapeutists aimed 
for is not so much that they viewed neurasthenic or psychasthenic symptoms as 
deviations from the main stream of conscious activity; but rather that they had so few 
qualms about adjusting the psyche to the reality that purportedly caused the disturbance 
in the first place. 
  As this therapeutic objective suggests, the psychotherapeutic movement’s 
idealistic conception of the subconscious circumscribed nervous illnesses within a 
decidedly spiritualized framework.  Reflecting the growing consensus among 
therapeutists at this time, the authors of Religion and Medicine averred that hypnosis 
and “constant suggestions … can remold the plastic nervous system” and train the will, 
“for the (latter) is nothing but a selective action or reaction to certain ideas” (1908: 245, 
249-51).7  Accordingly, they saw the properly reeducated psyche as one in which the 
“morbid emotional complex” gave way to “a feeling of pleasure and energy in all the acts 
and reactions of every-day life” (1908: 252-53).  Within this therapeutic matrix, the 
material foundations of the patient’s suffering faded into the background as the avenues 
to renewed health could be purportedly reached by internalizing ideal values and 
reasserting conscious control over one’s thoughts and actions.  Indeed, the type of 
“mental education” tendered by James Jackson Putnam, Harvard professor of 
neuropathology and practicing neurologist, exemplified a posture tone deaf to clinical 
data stirring with intonations of formidable social structures grown callous to human 
striving (1898).  For while describing how “the paralyzing sense of ineffectiveness and 
anticipation of failure (often quenched) fine impulses almost before they are born”, 
Putnam called upon his fellow therapeutists to redouble their dosages of character 
                                                
7 Cf. Mason, 1896: 451-452; Sidis, 1898: 79, 227; Prince, 1975: 109-112; Church and Peterson, 
1903: 572-573; Barker, 1906: 724; Dubois, 1908: 35-46; Patrick and Mix, 1908: 36-38. 
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building to ensure successful outcomes (1898: 565-66).  Besides learning how to accept 
limitations and economize energy “on a basis of cheerfulness and wide interests”, the 
neurasthenic, he stressed, “must have high hygienic and ethical ideals, and must live by 
them.  If he does not, he will fail” (1898: 584). 
 Consistent with this orientation, other therapeutists counseled that victims of 
fear and worry needed only to amass “a good store of valuable and permanent interests”, 
to coordinate their powers, and concentrate them “on some worthy end”, such as 
religion, “the most powerful antidote to worry”, to discover the road to renewal 
(Hopkins, 1909: 91).  In the facile prescriptions proffered by the Episcopal Bishop 
Samuel Fallows, an enthusiastic supporter of the Emmanuel Church, as well as a leading 
light of the movement in Chicago, personal good health and an “optimistic view of life” 
went hand in hand (1908: 83).  Reasoning how our own “intrinsic goodness is the 
measure of our force”, Fallows preached to victims of nervous prostration that “the 
extent of our (self-) control determines our goodness” (1908: 86, 163-64).  Thus by 
assiduously cultivating “happy suggestions”, he exclaimed, “(w)e can be masters of 
circumstances by goodness”.  Yet that the goal pivoted upon, in Prince’s words, 
“stimulating healthy reactions in the body”, so as to engender those “new points of view 
… that go with success and a roseate view of a new life” (1975: 129-30, 135) reveals how 
psychosomatic experts effected, in essence, a false reconciliation; not, that is, by 
rekindling any latent moral agency in the mind, but rather by, as Theodor Adorno later 
noted, transforming “extra-social” attributes of the individualistic socialization process 
into natural attributes of the individual (1967: 76).  And considered alongside their 
identification of selfishness—“unhealthy perverted reactions” (Prince, 1975: 130)—as the 
first link in the pathogenic chain leading to nervous afflictions only underscores how the 
idealistic gaze of the psychotherapeutist held symptoms of societal repression in a state 
of operative suspension, in illness no less than in health (1908: 351; McComb, 1910). 
 While this psycho-moralistic understanding of nervous illnesses and proper 
health underwrote the methods of hypnosis, suggestion, and reeducation deployed by 
psychotherapeutists, it also led them to advocate work and social work as remedial 
agents.  Whether it was the self-centered, hard-drinking factory laborer, the idle, upper-
middle-class woman, or the nerve-shattered artist, Worcester reasoned that, outside of 
the Emmanuel clinic, they required additional “help in the ordinary exigencies of their 
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daily lives; … to be reminded frequently of their good resolutions”.  “So”, he says, “I 
found a place for the social worker” (1909: 28).  Touting the latter’s task as an “unselfish 
effort to improve the conditions of human life”, Worcester believed that such a presence 
in the home of a neurasthenic would, in many cases, prevent “total disintegration of the 
family and social relationship” (1909: 128-29).  Thus while setting much store in 
Christianity’s great “spiritual potencies” and their own ability to “direct the energies of 
the individual into channels of health and freedom”, it fell to the movement’s joint-
interventionist efforts to carry out this transformation (1909: 60-61).  While Worcester’s 
task force channeled middle- and upper-middle-class-women to philanthropic and 
charitable organizations, it directed its working-class and professional patrons to “daily 
programmes of work” more suitable to their weakened constitutions (1909; McComb, 
1910a, 1910b).  Explaining this therapeutic scaffolding, Worcester exclaimed that the 
“(o)ne sovereign remedy” for the disease of “morbid self-reflection … is work” (1909: 65-
66).  Here again, as the psychotherapeutist’s affirmative stance absorbed his sociological 
critique, the barriers to functional autonomy and a vibrant mutualistic ethic 
(Montgomery, 1979) in capitalist-managed industries dissipated with it; work, that is, 
became the “great tonic”, thanks to its capacity to restore “the sufferer to the function of 
the real” (Fallows, 1909: 82; Worcester and McComb, 1909). 
 Yet as the Emmanuel Movement recruited greater expert guidance in the healing 
process, psychiatry began advancing a similar brand of moral medicine.  An energetic 
champion of the movement’s philosophy of treating the “whole man”, internist Richard 
Cabot saw in nervous illnesses an ever expanding role for psychiatrically-trained social 
workers (1908a; Baker, 1909).8  Psychotherapy, like religion, required getting “into 
people”, taking “account of every element of a man’s life … of all that concerns him 
vitally” (Cabot, 1908a: 7-8).  In this task, Cabot conceived the helping expert as the 
moral vaccine strengthening the nervously ill’s resistance against whatever 
discouragement, anxiety, and depression they met (1908b, 1909a).  The properly-
                                                
8 The following points do not take up the eventual disavowals of the Emmanuel Movement by 
Cabot or Putnam.  Nor, for that matter, do they broach the larger wave of opposition that medical, 
psychological, and clerical circles levied against it which eventually forced Worcester into private 
practice by 1912.  For detailed analyses (and differing interpretations) of these controversies, see 
Caplan, 1998: 131-46, and Gifford, 1996: 73-98.  Suffice it to note here that, despite both this 
public divestment campaign and the appropriation of psychoanalysis, the dynamic psychiatry 
movement which ensued was marked more by its continuity with, not its departure from, mind 
cure and the Emmanuel Movement (Bessette, 2012: 35-49).   
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cultivated, “wide-awake human being” accordingly learned to exorcise the “disease” of 
“day-dreaming of impractical ideals”—the “morbid separation of the thought from 
action, of soul from body” (Cabot, 1908c: 24).  Maintaining that nothing less than 
constant motion, change, and action sustained “balance” and preserved health against 
“such a self-corrosive process”, Cabot adamantly rejected the “lame and impotent 
solution” of the “rest cure” for the “work cure” (1909b: 31-33).  Besides being “a waste of 
time and money”, and paying insufficient attention to the psychological causes of illness, 
the former failed to reform the habits of the ill, to teach him “how to work—a lesson 
which he usually needs very sorely” (Cabot, 1909c: 24, 29; 1909d: 22, 24).  Taking the 
fully-regimented worker in all his one dimensionality as the embodiment of health, 
Cabot’s holistic treatment boiled down to heeding the prosaic wisdom of machine-like 
performance and practicing the virtues of repetition and routine (1908c; White, 1911).  
That the healed subject might merely have become the sum of his own functions, and a 
fragile sum at that, rather than a unitary self was a non-issue, for what glossed over the 
difference between an orientation that sought to take account of the subject’s “whole” 
life, and one that attempted to comprehend his “real division … into separated functions” 
was the healing narrative itself (Adorno, 1973: 67). 
 Thus, as the rest cure continued to fall out of favor beside this new appreciation 
for the therapeutic value of work, the psychotherapeutic movement began subscribing to 
the rationale efficiency experts advanced to validate the nascent managerial capitalist 
mode of labor.  In the last decades of the nineteenth century, Frederick Winslow Taylor 
initiated the attempt to systematically apply the methods of science to the problems of 
expanding capitalist enterprises with scientific management.  A key aspect of this 
venture, as Marxist sociologist Harry Braverman noted, was how it bypassed the 
antagonism that existed between resistant workers and exigent capitalists by 
investigating “not labor in general, but the adaptation of labor to the needs of capital” 
(1974: 86).  By the first years of the twentieth century, the ruling class’s attempts to 
revitalize itself and revamp its cultural hegemony by embracing, as Lears said, “a 
managerial ethos of continuous ‘peak performance’” (2005: 182, 200) coincided with 
Taylor’s zealous aim of granting management monopolistic control over “each step of the 
labor process and its mode of execution” (Braverman, 1974: 119).  Significant to this 
strategic coup, then, was how Taylor claimed that his markedly higher standards of 
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output not only proceeded from the unimpeachable authority of science (Lears, 2005); 
they also improved the labor process by setting it at “a pace under which men became 
happier and thrive” (1911: 25). 
 At this same juncture, psychotherapeutic wisdom concerning nervous illnesses 
and the labor process converged with that of other popular self-help authors by raising 
this performance ethic to the level of a spiritual—and incontrovertible—precept. 
Analogizing how the modern industrial worker was much like a “bent axle” or “a leaky oil 
tank”, Worcester and McComb argued that he “goes to pieces or breaks down not from 
overuse, but from wrong use” (1909; 1910b: 264).  Abstracting from the actual conditions 
of the industrialized work routine, they maintained that the key to refreshing work now 
lied entirely within the worker himself: the tolls of “waste and friction” could be 
eliminated once he mastered his own emotions, guilt, and desires (1909: 68-70).  Other 
self-help therapy tracts reinforced this type of psychological reductionism by insisting 
that “selfish spiritual tension” led to “misused energy” (Call, 1907: 1-2, 8), impeded 
industrial efficiency and, consequently, prevented one from “living with inspiration and 
power” (Gulick, 1913: 18).  In Horatio Dresser’s apodictic reasoning, the reality and telic 
principle of the “well-ordered brain”, unfettered by “nervous frictions”, sensuousness, 
ecstasy, or impatience, brooked no debate, since the tendencies and laws of this “active 
consciousness” (“ideal self”) were identical with the “(socioeconomic) activities which are 
steadily developing it” (1912: 125-27).  Translating these meditations into practice, and 
echoing Cabot’s “team-work” philosophy (1909a), Worcester affirmed how “find(ing) out 
what is wrong in the way an individual works, and (showing) him a better way is itself a 
very valuable factor in psychotherapy” (1909: 68).  That he and McComb deemed it 
necessary to create an agency of auxiliary experts, a Social Service Bureau, to assist in 
this effort highlights the irony of it: the movement’s “more effective assault” upon the 
forces producing the “maladies of the human soul” underwrote new forms of intrusion 
and psychological manipulation, while indirectly facilitating managerial capitalism’s 
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Cartesian splits … have blunted our ethical intelligence, fragmented 
our psyches, short-circuited our neurology, compromised 
democracy, and jeopardized our survival.  We register the loss in our 
bodies and our emotions, and our lives become tinged with trauma 
and tragedy…. In the new story, the capacity for empathy, mind-
reading, and collaboration distinguishes us not as women and men 
but as humans.  Within ourselves we have the resources we need.  
However adverse the political climate … they accumulate inside 
where nobody can take them away from us (Gilligan, 2011: 180). 
 
We have discovered that there are human strengths that act as 
buffers against mental illness: courage, future-mindedness, 
optimism, interpersonal skill, faith, work ethic, hope, honesty, 
perseverance, the capacity for flow and insight, to name several.  
Much of the task of prevention in this new century will be to create a 
science of human strength whose mission will be to understand and 
learn how to foster these virtues in young people (Seligman, 2005: 
5). 
 
Much like the starkly-imbalanced, spiritually-deadening Gilded Age milieu in which 
mind curists co-initiated an optimistic healing vision for self and society, the anomic, 
destructive egoism writ large that is neoliberal, market-fundamentalist society finds no 
shortage of would-be healers propagating a similar narrative.  As such, the generalized 
perception and ideological interpretation of “crisis” remains central as it fuels the 
narrative and healing modalities of today’s psy complex (Rose, 1990).  And no less than 
then, this aim stems from purportedly value-neutral ground in which the yield of 
numerous research grants and social scientific experiments—Schwab’s “accumulated 
wisdom”—nourish the comforting vision of a pragmatic vanguard dutifully guiding 
humanity incrementally towards greater societal harmonization.  For with the 
“misconceptions of the human mind” laid to rest, according to neurobiologist Antonio 
Damasio, homeostasis, “a harmonious life balance for all”, can, and ought to, be a 
primary objective of contemporary governance (2003: 288-89).  Conversely, social 
constructionists and poststructuralists, who guard themselves against any hint of 
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conformism, fail to see the contextual affinities between their own therapeutic values, of 
standing up for the “manifold unrealized potentials” of human experience (Hoffman, 
2009: 1065), and the deracinating flux of the prevailing socioeconomic order which 
pivots no less upon the hegemonic discourse of individual moral freedom (Woolfolk, 
2003).  In these ways, and not unlike the days of Wood, Worcester and Cabot, when the 
therapeutic project began in earnest, the mediative mechanism through which such 
experts perceive, articulate, and minister to both widely-felt needs and inchoate desires 
is “the ideological vision (that) represses awareness of what is impossible” (Gouldner, 
1976: 76). 
 Besides these parallels, though, the complexion and forward propulsion of the 
healing narrative today owes less to a causal-linear progression and more to the 
historical rupture of the 1960s, the economic and cultural-sexual revolutions.  At one 
pole, the narrative that post-Freudian existential psychologists such as Abraham 
Maslow, Rollo May, and Carl Rogers articulated trumpeted the self-actualizing self as the 
norm of health, posited a universal equality that did not exist, and both in a jargon that 
seduced theory away from comprehending the inhuman conditions in which men and 
women incurred psychical and physical harm by shifting the lens back onto “man 
himself” (Jacoby, 1997).  At the other pole, the discursive shift in emphasis from growth 
and becoming to support and coping by the mid-1970s—an “unparalleled diseasing of 
America”, as historian Eva Moscowitz recently noted (2001: 251)—underscored how the 
widespread embrace of desublimation necessitated new modalities of stabilization.  In 
other words, postwar affluence, expressivist-utilitarian individualism (Taylor, 2007), and 
the turn toward cultural releases as the bases of capitalist accumulation, required an 
open-ended process of secondary integration as their ballast (Rieff, 1966).  Yet at this 
juncture, the “intensely egalitarian projects devoted to realizing autonomy and freedom”, 
which Rogers advocated (Herman, 1995: 269), coincided with the private-property/free-
enterprise utopianism that neoliberal theorists postulated and economic elites pursued 
in their radical reconfigurations of regulatory institutions (Harvey, 2005: 37).  Thus this 
ostensive left-right freedom-from-politics consensus (Arendt, 1993: 148-51) 
subsequently set in motion a “vast re-rationalization of social life” (Rieff, 1966: 27).  For 
whether it was an episode like the “valium panic” among middle-class women (Herzberg, 
2006), or it was the “rational commodification of therapy” (Illouz, 2008: 161-71; cf. 
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Shorter, 1997) by insurance and pharmaceutical companies, the narrative of 
psychological relief and personal well-being that the psy professions supplied effectively 
attenuated both the intensification of workplace demands (Boltanski and Chiapello, 
2005: 217-54) and the erosion of institutionalized family life (Fukuyama, 1999; Wilcox, 
2006; Fox-Genovese, 2008) by placing the flexible renegotiation of identity at the center 
of the public sphere.  Indeed, as the proliferation of twelve-step programs met people’s 
growing demand for a means of shoring up their fractured lives, it did so by reaffirming 
the worldview of liberationist psychotherapy: that conforming to moral standards and 
conventional reality made one “sick” (Rice, 1996).  Put otherwise, such programs spoke 
less to epidemics of abuse, abandonment, and addiction, as sociologist John Steadman 
Rice argued, and more to “a pattern of indifference toward normative demands that 
constrain the individual and to the corresponding impermanence and unreliability of 
social attachments” (1996: 212).     
 That this mutually reinforcing process of psychotherapeutic liberation and 
emotional healing has become rudimental among contemporary therapeutists highlights 
the persistence of the romanticized naturalism and antidotal idealism that the first 
movements evinced.  For whether they look to either head off emotional pathologies, 
inculcate “high self-esteem and self-efficacy” (Yates and Masten, 2004: 521), or 
dismantle all “negative” barriers and mediating influences between the self and the 
“actual social world” in the name of a new “communicative democracy” (Hoggett, 2000), 
psy experts demonstrate how intellectual activism and an impoverished social 
imagination are readily compatible.  In one sense, against the ever-greater harm to 
human well-being that a globalized economic system bent on commodifying and 
financializing all aspects of life poses, therapeutists all the more insist upon tapping into 
the supposedly innate, uncontaminated resources or “hardwiring” within each individual 
as the best, if not only, chance of resistance.  As such, the very optimism of this healing 
narrative tends to embrace a broad-based stratagem that mirrors the totalizing and 
imperialistic pragmatics of the prevailing economic regime.  For by tracing, to one extent 
or another, the roots of all crises and maladaptations back to “dehumanizing divisions”, 
renunciations, and sacrifices that inegalitarian, gendered, and unenlightened 
upbringings inflict, the psy professions step up their calls for prioritizing a wide range of 
policy initiatives and scientifically-sound interventions to heal the splits between mind 
Diffractions.	  Graduate	  Journal	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture	  




and body, emotion and reason, feeling and cognition, etc.; break down “underlying 
intrapsychic defense mechanisms”; and, ultimately, foster a “process of mutual moral 
growth” (Scott, 2000; Gilligan, 2011).  Specialists plying the promising subfield of 
emotional intelligence thus hope to discover the mechanism or “software” in the brain 
where “EI resides” that will enable them to assist the “emotionally challenged” build 
“mental models to promote productive social engagement with others” (McCann et al., 
2008).  Others look to social neuroscience’s potential to “unravel some of the complex 
dynamics of human social interaction” and learning to not only map out emotively-
resilient developmental pathways, but better sort out the “underlying brain networks” of 
happiness (Hinton, Miyamoto, and Della-Chiesa, 2008; Kringlebach and Berridge, 
2010).  In all, achieving a social order abounding in intersubjective connectedness, 
positive socioemotional competencies, and a liberating “transcultural vision that frees us 
from the symbolic ties of our original cultures” comes into purview (Leontiev, 2006: 51).  
The concern, meanwhile, over whether it is abstract rationality’s objectivating attitude 
that has been reconciled with emotion, or it is emotion and intrapsychical relations that 
have been incorporated and seamlessly transformed into instrumental relations becomes 
a peripheral issue (Habermas, 1987: 336).  For not unlike the symmetrical advance of the 
first psychotherapeutic movement and monopoly capitalism’s early renovation, the 
paradox running through the therapeutic venture today resembles the one at the heart of 
neoliberalism: that the incidence of “intense state interventions and government by 
elites and ‘experts’ in a world where the state is supposed not to be interventionist … 
(denies) the very freedoms it is supposed to uphold” (Harvey, 2005: 69).  
 What these historical and ideological overlaps and parallels begin to delineate, 
then, is how an erstwhile homeopathic solution to the bewildering forces of rapid 
socioeconomic change has since become a hypertrophying mode of biopolitical 
governance that aims to fine-tune the “inner” resources of assent and constraint in 
accordance with existing economic and systemic imperatives.  On the one hand, though, 
after the left’s decades-long push for emotionally-purified forms of intimacy and 
childrearing—where transparency, reflexivity, and proceduralism was to remedy the 
patriarchal nuclear family structure guilty of inculcating destructive emotions and 
polarized strivings in men and women—“emotional democracy” (Giddens, 1992, 1994), 
or “a sense of multiple internal relatedness”, in Nancy Chodorow’s words (1989: 147), 
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largely prevails.  Yet on the other, between a growth-fixated neoliberal order predicated 
upon pliant pools of “human resources” and an expanding base of avid consumers, and a 
normative ideal of well-being oriented around “relational desires” and the quest for 
“psychic wholeness” (Gilligan and Richards, 2009: 195-97), little space or time remains 
from which either ego-integration (West, 2007), or a deeper sense of selfhood and moral 
obligation, can even take place (Craib, 1998).9  Instead, psychosomatic adaptation to 
modern exigencies, the spirit-centered path of the early therapeutists, is now an ethical 
mandate unto itself: to socially reproduce emotionally-nimble, empathic agents whose 
performance, goals, and values symbiotically match those of perpetually evolving 
corporate bodies (Goleman, 1998).  And with positive psychology’s refurbishment of the 
“whole” self under the metrical sign of “general well-being”, the hermeneutic circle 
closes; expert enjoined value learning and the how-to of meritocratic flourishing become 
quantifiable variables, the “new prosperity” index, in the ongoing process of lifeworld 
immunization (Seligman, 2011: 96-97; Habermas, 1987).  That biopsychiatry, on this 
front, increasingly reifies all embryonic conflicts, drives, and impulses that diverge from 
this relational-performative regime as acute disease entities in need of preemptive 
intervention (Singh and Rose, 2009) or pharmacotherapy, crisis management of the soul 
and the “homogenization of experiences on a global scale” proceed apace (Breggin, 
2000; Healy, 2004: 236).  As part of the optimistic healing narrative, though, the 
“flattened out psyche of thought and learning”, as Nikolas Rose argues, which “first-line” 
biopsychiatric interventions produce, only enhances “our capacities to adjust and 
readjust our somatic existence according to the exigencies of the life to which we aspire” 
                                                
9 Particularly noteworthy, in this light, are the findings furnished by a recent sociological study, 
Lost in Transition (Smith et al., 2011).  Probing the attitudes of 18-23 yr. old Americans 
(“emerging adults”) it reveals how many of the participants reflexively fell back upon “the power 
of positive thinking” to buffer their own “personal sense of self” from regrets or redoubtable 
circumstances, while just as many expressed difficulty grasping the distinction between an 
“objective moral truth and (a) relative human invention”, or even “an objective reality beyond the 
individual self” (152, 221-22).  And in almost inverse proportion to their astonishing lack of public 
engagement, the authors found nearly all fervently devoted to “private-sphere emotional and 
relational investments” (223).  Set against the mid-1980s study conducted by communitarian 
sociologist Robert Bellah and his colleagues, Habits of the Heart, which registered a decided 
preference among middle-class Americans for segmented private lives dedicated to leisure, 
careers, and consumption—“lifestyle enclaves”—Smith et al. pinpoint a further progression 
toward “the nearly total submersion of self into fluidly constructed, private networks of 
technologically managed intimates and associates”.  This “strongly relational way of engaging 
their ‘larger’ worlds”, they add, “clearly appears … closely connected to the technologies of 
communication that preoccupy their lives” (223-24).   
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(2003a: 418; 2003b: 58-59).  This, however, is only to say that the prospect of seeing 
through the façade of all therapeutically-engineered futures requires a fundamental shift 
of focus from the range of choices they make possible to the range of possibilities they 



























Diffractions.	  Graduate	  Journal	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture	  






Adorno TW (1967) Sociology and Psychology. New Left Review I (46): 67-80. 
——— (1973) In: Tarnowski K and Will F (trans) The Jargon of Authenticity. Evanston, 
 Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 
Arendt H (1993) Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought. New 
 York: Penguin Books.   
Baker RS (1909) New Ideals in Healing. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company. 
Barker LF (1906) Some Experience with the Simpler Methods of Psychotherapy and Re- 
 Education, Transaction of the Association of American Physicians XXI: 696-
724. 
Beard GM (1881) American Nervousness: Its Causes and Consequences. New York: 
 GP Putnam’s Sons. 
Beatty J (2007) The Age of Betrayal: The Triumph of Money in America, 1865-1900. 
 New York: Alfred A Knopf.   
Bederman G (1995) Manliness &Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in 
 the United States, 1880-1917. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Bessette MD (2012) ‘Nervous Diseases’ and the Politics of Healing: William James,  
 Josiah Royce, and the Early Dynamic Psychiatry Movement in America. Past  
 Tense 1(1): 22-49.   
Boltanski L and Chiapello E (2005) In: Elliott G (trans) The New Spirit of Capitalism. 
 London: Verso.   
Bordogna F (2008) William James at the Boundaries: Philosophy, Science, and the 
 Geography of Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Boyd TP (1914) The How and Why of the Emmanuel Movement: A Handbook on 
 Psychotherapeutics, 2nd edn. San Francisco: The Emmanuel Institute of Health. 
Braverman H (1974) Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the 
 Twentieth Century. New York: Monthly Review Press.   
Breggin PR (2000) Reclaiming Our Children: A Healing Plan for a Nation in Crisis. 
 Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Books.   
Diffractions.	  Graduate	  Journal	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture	  




Cabot R (1908a) The American Type of Psychotherapy. In: Parker WB (ed) 
 Psychotherapy: A Course of Reading in Sound Psychology, Sound Medicine 
 and Sound Religion I(1). New York: Centre Publishing Company, 5-12.  
——— (1908b) Creative Assertion. In: Parker WB (ed) Psychotherapy: A Course of  
 Reading in Sound Psychology, Sound Medicine and Sound Religion I(2). New 
 York: Centre Publishing Company, 9-21.  
——— (1908c) The Teamwork of Body and Soul. In: Parker WB (ed) Psychotherapy: A 
 Course of Reading in Sound Psychology, Sound Medicine and Sound Religion  
 I(3). New York: Centre Publishing Company, 17-30.  
——— (1909a) Social Service and the Art of Healing. New York: Moffat, Yard and 
 Company. 
——— (1909b) The Use and Abuse of Rest. In: Parker WB (ed) Psychotherapy: A Course 
 of Reading in Sound Psychology, Sound Medicine and Sound Religion II(2). 
 New York: Centre Publishing Company, 23-38.  
——— (1909c) Work Cure—I. In: Parker WB (ed) Psychotherapy: A Course of Reading 
 in Sound Psychology, Sound Medicine and Sound Religion III(1). New York: 
 Centre Publishing Company, 24-30.  
——— (1909d) Work Cure—II. In: Parker WB (ed) Psychotherapy: A Course of Reading 
 in Sound Psychology, Sound Medicine and Sound Religion III(2). New York: 
 Centre Publishing Company, 20-28.  
Cady HE (1919) Lessons in Truth: A Course of Twelve Lessons in Practical Christianity. 
 Kansas City, Mo.: Unity School of Christianity. 
Call AP (1907) The Heart of Good Health. New York: Thomas Y Crowell and  
 Company. 
Caplan E (1998) Mind Games: American Culture and the Birth of Psychotherapy. 
 Berkeley: University of California Press.   
Chodorow N (1989) Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory. New Haven, Conn.: Yale  
 University Press.   
Church A and Peterson F (1903) Nervous and Mental Diseases, 4th edn. Philadelphia: 
 WB Saunders and Company.   
Craib I (1998) Experiencing Identity. London: Sage Publications.   
Diffractions.	  Graduate	  Journal	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture	  




Cushman P (1995) Constructing the Self, Constructing America: A Cultural History of 
 Psychotherapy. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishers.   
Damasio A (2003) Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain. Orlando,  
 Fla.: Harvest/Harcourt, Inc.   
Demos J (1997) Oedipus and America: Historical Perspectives on the Reception of  
 Psychoanalysis in the United States. In: Pfister J and Schnog N (eds) 
 Inventing the Psychological; Toward a Cultural History of America. New 
Haven:  Yale University Press, 63-78.   
Dresser HW (1902) A Book of Secrets: With Studies in the Art of Self-Control. New 
 York: GP Putnam’s Sons.   
——— (1903) Man and the Divine Order: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion and in  
 Constructive Idealism. New York: GP Putnam’s Sons. 
——— (1908) A Physician to the Soul. New York: GP. Putnam’s Sons.   
 
——— (1912) Human Efficiency: A Psychological Study of Modern Problems. New 
 York: GP Putnam’s Sons.   
———  (1919) A History of the New Thought Movement. New York: Thomas Y
 Crowell Company.   
Dubois P (1908) In: Jelliffe SE and White WA (eds and trans) The Psychic Treatment of 
 Nervous Disorders: The Psychoneuroses and Their Moral Treatment, 4th edn. 
 New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company.   
Eddy MB (1889) Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures, 4th edn. (Boston: 1889).   
Ellul J (1975) In: Hopkin CE (trans) The New Demons. New York: The Seabury Press. 
Evans WF (1873) Mental Medicine: A Theoretical and Practical Treatise on Medical 
 Psychology. Boston: Carter and Pettee.   
——— (1884) The Mental Cure: Illustrating the Influence of the Mind on the Body, both 
 in Health and Disease, and the Psychological Method of Treatment, 6th edn.  
 Boston: Colby and Rich.  
Fallows S (1908) Health and Happiness; or Religious Therapeutics and Right Living. 
 Chicago: AG McClurg and Company. 
Diffractions.	  Graduate	  Journal	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture	  




———  (1909) Worry. In: Parker WB (ed) Psychotherapy: A Course of Reading in 
 Sound  Psychology, Sound Medicine and Sound Religion II(3): New York: Centre 
 Publishing Company, 77-85. 
Figlio K (1977) The Historiography of Scientific Medicine: An Invitation to the Human 
 Sciences. Comparative Studies in Society and History 19(3): 262-286.  
Fillmore C (1917) Christian Healing: The Science of Being, 6th edn. Kansas City, Mo.: 
 Unity School of Christianity.   
Flower BO (1910) Christian Science as a Religious Belief and a Therapeutic Agent.
 Boston: Twentieth Century Company.   
Foucault M (1982) The Subject and Power. Critical Inquiry 8(4): 777-795.   
Fox-Genovese E (2008) Marriage: The Dream that Refuses to Die. Wilmington, Del.:  
 ISI Books.   
Fukuyama F (1999) The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of 
 Social Order. New York: The Free Press.   
Furst LR (2008) Before Freud: Hysteria and Hypnosis in Later Nineteenth-Century  
 Psychiatric Cases. Lewisburg, Penn.: Bucknell University Press.   
Giddens A (1992) The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism 
 in Modern Societies. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press.   
——— (1994) Risk, trust, reflexivity. In: Beck U, Giddens A, and Lash S (eds) Reflexive 
 Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. 
 Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 187-194.   
Gifford S (1996) The Emmanuel Movement: The Origins of Group Treatment and the  
Assault on Lay Psychotherapy. Boston: Harvard University Press for the Francis  
Countway Library of Medicine. 
Gilligan C (2011) Joining the Resistance. Malden, Mass.: Polity Press.   
Gilligan C and Richards DAJ (2009) The Deepening Darkness: Patriarchy, Resistance, 
 & Democracy’s Future. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Goleman D (1998) Working with Emotional Intelligence. New York: Bantam Books. 
Gosling FG and Ray JM (1986) The Right to Be Sick: American Physicians and 
 Nervous Patients, 1885-1910. Journal of Social History 20(2): 251-267. 
Gosling FG (1988) Before Freud: Neurasthenia and the American Medical Community, 
 1870-1910. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.   
Diffractions.	  Graduate	  Journal	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture	  




Gouldner A (1976) The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology. New York: 
 Oxford University Press. 
Gulick LM (1913) The Efficient Life, 2nd edn. New York: Doubleday, Page and 
 Company.   
Hale NG, Jr (1971) Freud and the Americans: The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis in the 
 United States, 1876-1917. New York: Oxford University Press.   
——— (1995) The Rise and Crisis of Psychoanalysis in the United States: Freud and the 
 Americans, 1917-1985. New York: Oxford University Press.   
Habermas J (1987) In: McCarthy T (trans) The Theory of Communicative Action, 
Volume  2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Boston: 
Beacon  Press.   
Haller JS (1981) American Medicine in Transition, 1840-1910. Urbana: University of 
 Illinois Press.   
Harvey D (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Healy D (2004) Shaping the Intimate: Influences on the Experience of Everyday 
 Nerves. Social Studies of Science 34(2): 219-245. 
Herman E (1995) The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of  
 Experts. Berkeley: University of California Press.   
Herrick R (1908) The Master of the Inn. New York: Charles Scribners’s Sons. 
Herzberg D (2006) ‘The Pill You Love Can Turn on You’: Feminism, Tranquilizers, and 
 the Valium Panic of the 1970s. American Quarterly 58(1): 79-103. 
Hinton CK, Miyamoto K and Della-Chiesa B (2008) Brain Research, Learning and 
 Emotions: implications for education research, policy and practice. 
 European Journal of Education 43(1): 87-103.   
Hoffman IZ (2009) Doublethinking Our Way to ‘Scientific’ Legitimacy: the Desiccation  
 of Human Experience. Journal of the American Psychoanalytical Association 
 57(5): 1043-1070. 
Hoggett P (2000) Social policy and the emotions. In: Lewis G and Clarke J (eds) 
 Rethinking social policy. London: Sage/Open University, 141-155.   
Hopkins HM (1909) Psychotherapy in the Small Parish. In: Parker WB (ed)
 Psychotherapy: A Course of Reading in Sound Psychology, Sound Medicine and 
 Sound Religion II(1): New York: Centre Publishing Company, 88-92. 
Diffractions.	  Graduate	  Journal	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture	  




Illouz E (2008) Saving the Modern Soul: Therapy, Emotions, and the Culture of Self-
 Help. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press.   
Jacoby R (1997) Social Amnesia: A Critique of Contemporary Psychology. Boston:  
 Beacon Press.   
James W (1967) The Energies of Men. In: McDermott JJ (ed) The Writings of William 
 James. New York: Modern Library, 671-683.   
Janet P (1908) Les Obsessions et La Psychastnénie, I. Paris: Ancienee Librairie Germer 
 Baillière et Cie. 
Kernberg O (2004) Contemporary Controversies in Psychoanalytic Theory, Techniques, 
 and Their Applications. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.   
Kringlebach ML and Berridge KC (2010) The Neuroscience of Happiness and Pleasure.  
 Social Research 77(2): 659-678.   
Lasch C (1965) The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963: The Intellectual as a 
 Social Type. New York: Norton.   
Lears J (1981) No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American 
 Culture, 1880-1920. New York: Pantheon Books.   
———  (2005) The Managerial Revitalization of the Rich. In: Fraser S and Gerstle G 
 (eds) Ruling America: A History of Wealth and Power in a Democracy, 
 Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 181-214. 
———  (2009) Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920. New 
 York: HarperCollins.   
Leontiev D (2006) Positive Personality Development: Approaching Personal Autonomy.   
In: Csikszentmihalyi M and Selega I (eds) A Life Worth Living: Contributions to 
Positive Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 49-81.   
Lutz T (1991) American Nervousness, 1903: An Anecdotal History. Ithaca: Cornell 
 University Press. 
McCann C et al. (2008) Emotional Intelligence as Pop Science, Misled Science, and 
 Sound Science: A Review and Critical synthesis of Perspectives from the Field of  
 Psychology. In: Karafyllis NC and Ulshöfer F (eds) Sexualized Brains:  
 Scientific Modeling of Emotional Intelligence from a Cultural Perspective.  
 Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 131-148. 
McComb S (1910a) My Experience with Nervous Sufferers. Harper’s Bazaar 44: 29-32.  
Diffractions.	  Graduate	  Journal	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture	  




——— (1910b) Nervousness—A National Menace. Everybody’s Magazine 22: 258-264. 
Marden OS (1909) Peace, Power, and Plenty. New York: Thomas Y Crowell Company.   
Mason RO (1896) Educational Uses of Hypnotism. The North American Review 
 163(479): 448-455.   
Meyer A (1911) The Dynamic Interpretation of Dementia Praecox. American Journal of 
 Psychology 21(3): 385-403. 
Meyer D (1980) The Positive Thinkers: Religion as Pop Psychology from Mary Baker 
 Eddy to Oral Roberts. New York: Pantheon.   
Mitchell SW (1885) Lectures on Diseases of the Nervous System, Especially in Women. 
 Philadelphia: Lea Brothers and Company.   
———  (1887) Wear and Tear; or Hints for the Overworked. Philadelphia: J.B. 
 Lippincott Company.   
Montgomery D (1979) Workers’ Control in America: Studies in the History of Work, 
 Technology, and Labor Struggles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Moscowitz ES (2001) In Therapy We Trust: America’s Obsession with Self-Fulfillment.  
 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
Patrick HT and Mix CL (eds) (1908) The Practical Medicine Series X, Nervous and 
 Mental Diseases. Chicago: The Year Book Publishers.   
Pernick MS (1985) A Calculus of Suffering: Pain, Professionalism, and Anesthesia in 
 Nineteenth-Century America. New York: Columbia University Press.   
Powell LP (1909) The Emmanuel Movement in a New England Town: A Systematic 
 Account of Experiments and Reflections Designed to Determine the Proper 
 Relationship Between the Minister and the Doctor in the Light of Modern Needs.
 New York: GP Putnam’s Sons.   
Prince M (1885) The Nature of Mind and Human Automatism. Philadelphia: JP 
 Lippincott Company.   
———  (1975) The Educational Treatment of Neurasthenia. In: Hale NG, Jr (ed) 
 Psychotherapy and Multiple Personality: Selected Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: 
 Harvard University Press. 
———  (1975) The Psychological Principles and the Field of Psychotherapy. In: Hale 
 NG, Jr (ed) Psychotherapy and Multiple Personality: Selected Essays. 
 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.   
Diffractions.	  Graduate	  Journal	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture	  




Putnam JJ (1898) Neurasthenia. In: Loomis AL and Thompson WG (eds) A System of 
 Practical Medicine IV. New York: Lea Brothers and Company, 549-595. 
———  (1904) The Values of the Physiological Principle in the Study of Neurology. 
 Boston Medical and Surgical Journal 151: 641-647. 
———  (1909) The Service to Nervous Invalids of the Physician and of the Minister. 
 Harvard Theological Review 2(2): 235-250.   
Rice JS (1996) A Disease of One’s Own: Psychotherapy, Addiction, and the Emergence 
 of Co-Dependency. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.   
Rieff P (1959) Freud: The Mind of the Moralist. New York: Viking Press.     
———  (1966) Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud. Chicago: 
 University of Chicago Press.   
———  (1990) Cooley and Culture. In: Imber J (ed) The Feeling Intellect: Selected 
 Writings. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 310-320.   
Roosevelt T (1910) The Strenuous Life, 5th edn. New York: The Review of Reviews 
 Company.   
Rose N (1990) Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self. London: Routledge.     
———  (2003a) The neurochemical self and its anomalies. In: Ericson R (ed) Risk and  
 Morality. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 407-437. 
———  (2003b) Neurochemical Selves. Society (Nov/Dec): 46–59. 
 
Royce J (1909) The Recent Psychotherapeutic Movement. In: Parker WB (ed) 
 Psychotherapy: A Course of Reading in Sound Psychology, Sound Medicine and 
 Sound Religion III(5). New York: Centre Publishing Company, 17-36. 
Satter B (1999) Each Mind a Kingdom: American Women, Sexual Purity, and the New  
 Thought Movement, 1875-1920. Berkeley: University of California Press.    
Schwab SI (1907) The Use of Intercourse as a Therapeutic Agent in the Psychoneuroses: 
 A Contribution to the Art of Psychotherapy. Journal of Nervous and Mental 
 Disease 34: 497-503.   
Scott FE (2000) Participative Democracy and the Transformation of the Citizen: Some  
 Intersections of Feminist, Postmodernist, and Critical Thought. American 
 Review of Public Administration 30(3): 252-270.   
Diffractions.	  Graduate	  Journal	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture	  




Seligman MEP (2005) Positive Psychology, Positive Prevention, and Positive Therapy. 
 In: Snyder CR and Lopez SJ (eds) The Handbook of Positive Psychology. Oxford:  
 Oxford University Press, 3-9.   
———  (2011) Flourish: A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-being.  
 New York: Free Press.   
Shamdasani S (2001) Claire, Lise, Jean, Nadia, and Gisèle: Preliminary Notes towards a 
 Characterisation of Pierre Janet’s Psychasthenia. In: Gijswijt-Hofstra M and  
 Porter R (eds) Cultures of Neurasthenia from Beard to the First World War. 
 Amsterdam: Rodopi, 363-386. 
Shorter E (1997) A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of 
 Prozac. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.   
Sicherman B (1976) The Paradox of Prudence: Mental Health in the Gilded Age. 
 Journal of American History 62(March): 890-912.   
Sidis B (1898) The Psychology of Suggestion: A Research into the Subconscious Nature 
 of Man and Society. New York: D Appleton and Company.   
———  (1910) The Psychotherapeutic Value of the Hypnoidal State. In: Gerrish FH (ed)  
 Psychotherapeutics: A Symposium. Boston: Gorham Press, 119-144. 
Singh I and Rose N (2009) Biomarkers in psychiatry. Nature 460(9): 202-207.   
Smith C et al. (2011) Lost in Transition: The Dark Side of Emerging Adulthood. Oxford:  
 Oxford University Press.   
Starr P (1982) The Social Transformation of American Medicine. New York: Basic 
 Books.   
Taylor C (2007) A Secular Age. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.   
Taylor FW (1911) Shop Management. New York: Harper and Brothers.   
Teahan JF (1979) Warren Felt Evans and Mental Healing: Romantic Idealism and 
 Practical Mysticism in Nineteenth-Century America. Church History 48(1): 63-
 80. 
Theriot NM (2001) Negotiating Illness: Doctors, Patients, and Families in the 
Nineteenth  Century. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 37: 349-368. 
Trachtenberg A (1982) The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded 
 Age. New York: Hill and Wang.   
Diffractions.	  Graduate	  Journal	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture	  




Trine RW (1897) In Tune with the Infinite; Or Fullness of Peace, Power, and Plenty, 
 New York: Thomas Y Crowell and Company.   
———  (1910) The Land of Living Men. New York: Dodge Publishing Company. 
Tuttle JE (1907) Prosperity through Thought Force. Holyoke, Mass.: Elizabeth Towne.   
Warner JH (1986) The Therapeutic Perspective: Medical Practice, Knowledge, and 
 Identity in America, 1820-1885. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Weiss R (1969) The American Myth of Success: From Horatio Alger to Norman Vincent 
 Peale. New York: Basic Books. 
West M (2007) Feeling, Being, and the Sense of Self: A New Perspective on Identity, 
 Affect, and Narcissistic Disorders. London: Karnac Books. 
White WA (1911) Outlines of Psychiatry, 3rd edn. New York: The Nervous and Mental 
 Disease Publishing Company. 
Whorton JC (2002) Nature Cures: The History of Alternative Medicine in America. 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Wilcox WB (2006) Suffer the Little Children: Marriage, the Poor, and the Commonweal.  
 In: George RP and Elshtain JB (eds) The Meaning of Marriage: Family, State,  
 Market, and Morals. Dallas: Spence Publishing Company, 242-254.   
Wilmans H (1900) The Conquest of Death. Seabreeze, Fla.: International Scientific 
 Association. 
Wood H (1893) Ideal Suggestion through Mental Photography: A Restorative System 
for  Home and Private Use. Boston: Lee and Shepard Publishers. 
———  (1903) The New Thought Simplified: How to Gain Harmony and Health.
 Boston: Lothrop, Lee and Shepard Company.   
———  (1908) The New Old Healing. Boston: Lothrop, Lee and Shepard Company. 
Woolfolk A (2003) The Therapeutic Ideology of Moral Freedom. Journal of Classical 
 Sociology 3: 247-262.   
Worcester E, McComb S, and Coriat IH (1908) Religion and Medicine: The Moral 
 Control of Nervous Disorders. New York: Moffat, Yard and Company.   
Worcester E and McComb S (1909) The Christian Religion as a Healing Power: A 
 Defense and Exposition of the Emmanuel Movement. New York: Moffat, Yard 
 and Company.  
Worcester E (1932) Body, Mind, and Spirit. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 
Diffractions.	  Graduate	  Journal	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Culture	  




Yates TM and. Masten AS (2004) Fostering the Future: Resilience Theory and the 
 Practiceof Positive Psychology. In: Linlely PA and Joseph S (eds) Positive 
 Psychology in Practice. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 521-539.   
 
 
 
